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In this newly revised and expanded version of a well-known reader on the Vietnam 
period, Marvin Gettleman and his colleagues provide more than just a documentary 
record of some key Vietnam decisions. Reading Vietnam and America is like opening a 
time capsule: found inside are living examples of 1960s activists against the war. For the 
anti-war movement, this volume could very easily serve as the historical indictment of 
the American role in Indochina.  
The argument documented by Gettleman, et al. lays the blame for the Vietnam debacle 
completely at America's doorstep, specifically in a series of decisions to prolong or 
impede the Viet Minh effort to free their country from colonialism. Beginning with the 
American decision to acquiesce in French post -war efforts to reinstate colonial control 
over Indochina, the US took a series of actions that brought on the holocaust: the division 
of Vietnam following the 1954 Geneva accords; violation of the free-election provisions 
of the Geneva accords; aid to the illegitimate Diem regime; harassment of North Vietnam 
(the Gulf of Tonkin incident); intervention in the ground war and the "unlimited" air war 
against North Vietnam. What Gettleman and his colleagues seem to suggest is that 
Hanoi's victory in Vietnam was inevitable; American intervention, motivated by blind 
anti-communism and a disdain for the down trodden masses of the developing world, 
amounted to nothing more than gratuitous violence. In the end, the massive infusion of 
American resources could only delay the victory of liberation forces over imperialism 
and the puppet regime in Saigon.  
After reading this volume one notices a Vietnam paradox: in hindsight, the conflict 
appears both unavoidable and unnecessary. Ho Chi Minh and his band of freedom 
fighters were dedicated and sophisticated communists, adept at play ing both Moscow 
and Beijing for all they were worth. Simultaneously, rank and file members of the 
National Liberation Front (NLF) seemed to be motivated by nationalist ambitions; they 
just used Marxist-Leninist jargon to communicate their anti-colonial message to Western 
audiences. Americans might have cut a deal with the nationalists in the NLF, but once 
Hanoi became a Soviet client, the "liberation" of South Vietnam was destined to become 
a focal point of the superpower standoff. Hanoi's failure to prevent Vietnam from 
becoming the Cold War's greatest battleground was a strategic mistake of enormous 
consequence. Vietnam has not yet recovered from the effort to achieve the "Great Spring 
Victory" of 1975.  
This rather subtle analysis is beyond the scope of the excerpts of secondary sources found 
in Vietnam and America. When they wrote in the 1960s and early 1970s, the authors cited 
were interested in demonstrating American perfidy. Not even Rousseau would argue with 
the reason hunger one contributor pro vides to explain why the Viet Minh started the 
August 1945 revolution. (p. 17) By contrast, other contributors "find it particularly 
difficult to accept" that a 1964 American bombing raid against a leper colony was an 
"accident." (p. 464) Descriptions offered of the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) "swift 
and peaceful" occupation of the old imperial capital of Hue appear particularly ominous 
in hindsight:  
At dawn, the new masters of the city went through the streets in groups of ten. In each 
group, there was a leader who spoke to the people through the bullhorn .... The other 
members of the team ... knocked on doors and passed out pamphlets and leaflets. Joking 
and laughing, the soldiers walk in the streets and gardens without showing any fear .... It 
didn't seem that these residents were being coerced in any way. (p. 367)  
Several thousand residents, including all civil leaders loyal to the Saigon regime, 
disappeared during the NVA occupation of Hue. Several hundred victims had been 
buried alive by the NVA. Gettleman and his colleagues, however, never bothered to 
mention why NVA coercion in Hue was an issue during the Tet offensive.  
Vietnam and America clearly illustrates that anti-war activists of the 1960s felt betrayed 
by the United States. When individuals armed with only naive beliefs in the infallibility 
and benevolence of US intentions and actions con fronted the horrors of Vietnam, they 
did not interpret the American experience in Vietnam as simply the darker side of 
bureaucracy, the Cold War, technology or the modern age. Instead, America came to 
personify evil, while the "liberation forces" came to represent what America once stood 
for, i.e., all that was good in the world.  
For those coming of age in the aftermath of Vietnam, this dichotomous view of conflict 
and global politics seems naive and hopelessly simplistic. Cynicism and a loss of faith in 
democratic institutions are a legacy of the war. But, for many who came of age during the 
conflict, the Vietnam war remains a polemical issue, definitely an inappropriate subject 
for historical or analytical reassessment. As one of the editors concludes: "For the past 
twenty years many of us have been struggling to keep the memory of those images [of 
US atrocities] fresh and vivid, so as to combat one and another revisionist version of the 
Vietnam war." (p. 521) In sum, Vietnam and America is probably best viewed as a 
document from the Vietnam war and not a history of the conflict.  
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